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The Einstellung effect is the counterintuitive ﬁnding that prior experience or domain-speciﬁc
knowledge can under some circumstances interfere with problem solving performance.
This effect has been demonstrated in several domains of expertise including medicine and
chess. In the present study we explored this effect in the context of a simpliﬁed anagram
problem solving task. Participants solved anagram problems while their eye movements
were monitored. Each problem consisted of six letters: a central three-letter string whose
letters were part of the solution word, and three additional individual letters. Participants
were informed that one of the individual letterswas a distractor letter andwere asked to ﬁnd
a ﬁve-letter solution word. In order to examine the impact of stimulus familiarity on problem
solving performance and eye movements, the central letter string was presented either as
a familiar three-letter word, or the letters were rearranged to form a three-letter nonword.
Replicating the classic Einstellung effect, overall performance was better for nonword than
word trials. However, participants’ eye movements revealed a more complex pattern of
both interference and facilitation as a function of the familiarity of the central letter string.
Speciﬁcally, word trials resulted in shorter viewing times on the central letter string and
longer viewing times on the individual letters than nonword trials. These ﬁndings suggest
that while participantswere better able to encode andmaintain themeaningful word stimuli
in working memory, they found it more challenging to integrate the individual letters into
the central letter string when it was presented as a word.
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INTRODUCTION
The concept that stimulus familiarity and previously acquired
domain knowledge might impair problem solving performance
has been referred to by a variety of interrelated terms including
functional ﬁxedness, negative transfer, mental set, and Einstel-
lung. Functional ﬁxedness refers to cases where familiarity with
habitual uses of objects blocks other uses from being consid-
ered. For example, in the classic “candle-box” insight problem
introduced by Duncker (1945) the presented use of the box as a
container is hypothesized to interfere with the required consid-
eration of the box as a shelf for supporting the candle. Similarly,
negative transfer refers to the notion that the retrieval of pre-
viously acquired stimulus–response associations can impair the
establishment and maintenance of new stimulus-response associ-
ations (e.g., Schultz, 1960; Sweller, 1980; Chrysikou and Weisberg,
2005; Landrum, 2005; Osman, 2008). Finally, a problem solving
set or mental set refers to the negative impact of prior exposure
to similar problems (either pre-experimental or during the exper-
iment), which triggers a familiar but inappropriate solution and
prevents alternative solutions from being considered. The Ein-
stellung effect (Einstellung is German for attitude), which was
originally demonstrated by Luchins’ (1942) seminal series of water
jar experiments, constitutes an excellent illustration of the nega-
tive impact of a mental set (for a review see Bilalic´ and McLeod,
2014). In this paradigm, habitual approaches to problem solv-
ing are induced through exposure to multiple problems that have
similar solution methods. When a problem is subsequently pre-
sented for which the habitual solution method is not appropriate,
many participants claim that the problem is unsolvable. However,
naive participants can ﬁnd the solution quickly, thus showing
that the problem is not intrinsically difﬁcult and that the difﬁ-
culty experienced by solvers reﬂects the negative impact of prior
experience.
When considered in the context of human expertise, the idea
that prior experience and stimulus familiarity might interfere
with problem solving performance seems at ﬁrst blush to be
rather counterintuitive. This is because there is a large body of
research demonstrating that stimulus familiarity and domain-
speciﬁc knowledge acquired through extensive and deliberate
practice underlie the superior performance of experts relative to
their less skilled counterparts (for a review see Ericsson and Char-
ness, 1994). However, experts are not immune to the negative
impact of prior experience and stimulus familiarity as demon-
strated in studies of expertise in medicine (de Graaff, 1989;
Croskerry, 2003; Gordon and Franklin, 2003) and chess (Saar-
iluoma, 1992; Reingold et al., 2001b; Bilalic´ et al., 2008a,b, 2010;
Sheridan and Reingold, 2013; Bilalic´ and McLeod, 2014). For
example, Bilalic´ et al. (2008a) employed eye movement moni-
toring to study the Einstellung effect in chess experts. Players
were required to ﬁnd a checkmate with the fewest number of
moves. There were two possible solutions: a familiar ﬁve-move
sequence and a less well-known three-move sequence (the optimal
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solution). After identifying the familiar solution, expert chess play-
ers reported that theywere searching for the optimal one. However,
the eye movement record revealed that their attention continued
to be directed more often towards chess board regions involved in
the familiar rather than the optimal solution. Thus, it appears that
the Einstellung effect demonstrated in chess experts was due to
the familiar scenario activating a schema in memory that directs
attention towards information relevant to itself, and away from
other information (Bilalic´ et al., 2008a, 2010; Bilalic´ and McLeod,
2014).
In the present study, in order to further investigate the neg-
ative inﬂuence of stimulus familiarity on problem solving, we
monitored participants’ eye movements while they performed a
modiﬁed anagram problem solving task that was introduced by
Ellis et al. (2011). Anagram tasks provide a unique opportunity to
study the Einstellung effect in a domain of expertise possessed
by most adults, that is, their familiarity with words. In addi-
tion, unlike most problem solving tasks that were employed to
study the Einstellung effect, the use of anagrams allows for the
creation of a large number of independent trials in which an
Einstellung effect might occur. Anagrams have long been used
to study insight problem solving (for a review see Ellis et al.,
2011) as well as to demonstrate the negative impact of a men-
tal set on problem solving performance (e.g., Rees and Israel,
1935; Maltzman and Morrisett, 1952; Kaplan and Schoenfeld,
1966; Juola and Hergenhahn, 1967). In particular, it has been
established (e.g., Beilin and Horn, 1962; Ekstrand and Domi-
nowski, 1965, 1968; Tresselt and Mayzner, 1965; Mayzner and
Tresselt, 1966) that solution rates are lower and response times
are slower when the solution word (e.g., HEART) is scram-
bled to create a word anagram (e.g., EARTH) than a nonword
anagram (e.g., THREA). It is likely that the familiar word ana-
gram produces activation (orthographic, phonological, lexical,
and/or semantic) that is irrelevant to the solution and hin-
ders the decomposition and restructuring operations that are
required to produce the solution word (e.g., Hollingworth, 1935;
Devnich, 1937).
The present investigation involved eye movement monitor-
ing during anagram problem solving. As illustrated in Figure 1,
the anagram task we used consisted of six uppercase letters: a
centrally located three-letter string, plus three individual letters
positioned above and to either side of the central letter string.
The central letter string could be arranged either as a familiar
three-letter word, or as a meaningless string of three letters. Par-
ticipants were asked to produce a ﬁve-letter solution word, and
were informed that one of the individual letters was a distractor
letter that was not part of the solution word. Using a similar ana-
gram task, Ellis et al. (2011) reported that near the beginning of
trials, viewing times on the distractor and solution letters were
indistinguishable, meaning that participants did not immediately
perceive that the distractor letter was irrelevant to the solution.
Towards the end of trials, viewing times on the distractor letter
decreased relative to the solution letters, indicating that partial
solution knowledge had developed, and this change occurred sev-
eral seconds prior to solution. Importantly, the pattern of viewing
times was the same regardless of whether or not participants
reported a subjective experience of insight upon solution, thereby
FIGURE 1 | Examples of the anagram problem stimulus display, shown
with the central letter string arranged as a word (A) and as a
meaningless letter string (B), and an illustration of the circular interest
areas within which fixations were assigned to the individual letters or
the central letter string, shown here as Xs (C).The solution to the
anagram problems is TOUCH.
demonstrating a dissociation between the subjective experience of
insight and the objective accumulation of solution knowledge. In
the present study we expected to replicate the pattern reported
by Ellis et al. (2011). In addition, based on previous ﬁndings
with anagrams (e.g., Beilin and Horn, 1962; Ekstrand and Domi-
nowski, 1965, 1968; Tresselt and Mayzner, 1965; Mayzner and
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Tresselt, 1966) we predicted better problem solving performance
when the central letter string was presented as a nonword than
a word. Finally, we explored differences in the pattern of look-
ing behavior as a function of the familiarity of the central letter
string.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Sixty undergraduates from the University of Toronto Mississauga
participated in exchange for partial course credit or $10. All partic-
ipants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and were ﬂuent
English speakers.
APPARATUS
An SR Research EyeLink 1000 eye tracking system was used
to record participants’ eye movements with a sampling rate of
1000 Hz. The stimuli were displayed on a 19-inch Viewsonic
monitor with a refresh rate of 75 Hz and a screen resolution of
1024 × 768. Participants were seated 60 cm from the display and
used a chinrest with a head support to minimize head movement.
Following calibration, gaze-position error was less than 0.5◦.
MATERIALS
Anagram problems consisted of six uppercase letters: a cen-
trally located three-letter string, plus three individual letters
positioned above and to either side of the central letter string
(see Figure 1 for examples). All three letters in the central let-
ter string belonged to the solution word, while only two of the
individual letters belonged to the solution word, with the third
being a randomly placed distractor letter. The task was to com-
bine two of the three individual letters with the central letter
string to create a ﬁve-letter solution word. Each anagram prob-
lem had only one possible solution, meaning that the distractor
letter did not allow for the formation of any alternative ﬁve-letter
words.
Each anagram problem could be presented in either “word” or
“nonword” condition. In the “word” condition, the central letter
string consisted of a three-letter word, while in the “nonword”
condition, the central letter string consisted of a scrambled non-
word version of those same three letters (see Figure 1). For each
anagram problem, the identity and location of the three individ-
ual letters was the same across both conditions, such that the only
difference between a given anagram problem in the two condi-
tions was the conﬁguration of the central letter string as a word or
nonword. In the “word” condition, the central letter string words
had a mean frequency of 435 per million (SD = 1243) according
to Brysbaert and New (2009).
Solution words were made up of ﬁve unique letters, always
began with a consonant, and contained either one vowel (33%
of problems) or two vowels (67% of problems). Solution words
had a mean frequency of 175 per million (SD = 396) according
to Brysbaert and New (2009). The central letter string always con-
sisted of two consonants and a vowel, as did the three individual
letters. In order to remind participants that the three letters in
the central letter string must always be included in the solution
word, these letters were displayed in green, in a slightly smaller
and bolder font than the three individual letters, which were
displayed in black. Each anagram problem subtended approx-
imately ﬁve visual degrees in height and 14 visual degrees in
width.
The location of the individual distractor letter was counter-
balanced across anagram problems. In an attempt to avoid any
a priori bias away from the distractor letter, we matched the
distractor letter with the other two individual solution letters
in terms of letter frequency (averaged across all ﬁve possi-
ble letter positions within the solution word) using tables by
Mayzner and Tresselt (1965). Across all experimental anagrams,
the mean frequency of the distractor letter was no different
from the mean frequency of the individual solution letters (dis-
tractor M = 193, SD = 91, solution M = 199, SD = 115,
t < 1).
PROCEDURE
Participants completed six practice trials followed by 72 experi-
mental trials. Half the anagram problems were presented in the
“word” condition and half were presented in the “nonword” con-
dition, and both anagram order and central letter string type were
randomized for each participant. Across participants, each ana-
gram problem was presented an equal number of times in the
“word” and “nonword” conditions.
Every trial began on a blank screen with a central ﬁxa-
tion cross. After 1000 ms, the anagram problem appeared and
remained on the screen until a response was made, or until
the trial timed out after 45 s. Participants were instructed
that speed of responding was of utmost importance and were
discouraged from verifying their solution prior to response,
even if that might elicit the occasional incorrect solution.
Participants pressed a button on the response pad in order
to respond. The stimulus display then disappeared and par-
ticipants verbalized their answer to the experimenter, who
provided feedback as to whether or not their response was
correct.
After every trial, participants were asked to classify their sub-
jective experience of solving the anagram problem. Participants
selected one of the following options (from Novick and Sherman,
2003) by pressing a corresponding button on the response pad.
1 “The solution came to mind suddenly, seemingly out of
nowhere. I have no awareness of having done anything to try
to get the answer.”
2 “I tried various letter arrangements in order to solve the ana-
gram, but none of them seemed to work. Then the solution
came to mind suddenly.”
3 “I tried various letter arrangements in order to solve the ana-
gram. I was able to build on one of these arrangements to work
out the solution step by step.”
4 “I did not solve the anagram.”
We considered options 1 and 2 to describe subjective experi-
ences of insight, and labeled all trials where participants selected
option 1 or 2 as “popout” trials. Option 3 does not describe
a subjective experience of insight, so trials where participants
selected option 3 were labeled “non-popout” trials. Participants
made another button press to advance to the next trial at their
own pace.
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RESULTS
Our main focus in this experiment involved examining the effect
of central letter string type (word vs. nonword) on mean task per-
formance and eye movement measures. However, we also wanted
to ensure that manipulating central letter string type did not alter
the nature of the problem solving task as compared to prior ﬁnd-
ings (Ellis et al., 2011). Accordingly, while we primarily focus on
the differences between word and nonword trials, we also exam-
ined any interaction between the familiarity of the central letter
string and participants’ subjective experience of insight (i.e., tri-
als in which the solution was experienced as emerging suddenly
were classiﬁed as popout trials, whereas trials in which the solu-
tion was experienced as gradual were classiﬁed as non-popout
trials; see Method section for details). Across participants, 52.7%
of trials were correct, 4.2% of trials were incorrect, and 43.1%
of trials timed out with no solution. Mean response time for
correct trials was 14.3 s (SD = 3.3 s), with 69.0% of correct tri-
als classiﬁed by participants as popout, and 31.0% classiﬁed as
non-popout. The effect of central letter string type on overall
problem solving performance is summarized in Table 1. Impor-
tantly, response times were signiﬁcantly slower for word trials than
for nonword trials. In addition, therewas a numerical trend toward
lower accuracy for word trials than nonword trials, although
this difference did not reach signiﬁcance. Finally, there was no
impact of stimulus familiarity on the subjective experience of
insight problem solving, as shown by the virtually identical pro-
portion of word trials and nonword trials that were classiﬁed as
popout.
Eye movement analyses were performed only on correct trials,
and only included ﬁxations that could be assigned to a particular
item in the stimulus display. Speciﬁcally, a ﬁxation was assigned
to an individual letter or to the central letter string if it fell within
a 192 pixel diameter circle around that item (these ﬁxation areas
did not overlap; for an illustration, see Figure 1C). Within cor-
rect trials across participants, 69.9% of ﬁxations were assigned
to the central letter string, 28.3% of ﬁxations were assigned to
one of the three individual letters, and 1.8% of ﬁxations could
not be assigned to either the central letter string or the individual
letters. Assigned ﬁxations were then converted to dwells, where
a dwell is deﬁned as one or more consecutive ﬁxations within
the same area prior to an eye movement to another area. As
shown in Table 1, corresponding to the slower response times
for word than nonword trials, there was a greater number of
dwells per trial on both the central letter string and the individual
letters for word trials as compared to nonword trials, revealing
the classic negative inﬂuence of familiarity on problem solving
performance.
However, several ﬁne-grained eye movement measures, shown
in Figure 2, revealed a more complex pattern of the effects of
central letter string type. More speciﬁcally, we calculated overall
means for the following eye movement measures: (a) duration of
the initial latency on the central letter string (i.e., the interval from
stimulus onset until the ﬁrst eye movement that exited the central
letter string area); (b) dwell duration on the central letter string
during subsequent revisits; and (c) dwell duration on the indi-
vidual letters. For each eye movement measure, we carried out a
2× 2ANOVAwith subjective report (popout vs. non-popout) and
central letter string type (word vs. nonword) as independent vari-
ables. As can be seen in Figure 2, some eye movement measures
revealed facilitation for word trials relative to nonword trials, while
other eye movement measures revealed interference. In addition,
there were no signiﬁcant interactions between central letter string
type and subjective report for any eye movement measure (all
Fs < 1.45, n.s.), indicating that the differences between word and
nonword trials were the same for both popout and non-popout
trials. Speciﬁcally, the initial latency on the central letter string was
much shorter for word trials than for nonword trials (Figure 2A;
F(1,59) = 29.78, p < 0.001), and this processing advantage for
words over nonwords was also present for subsequent dwells on
the central letter string (Figure 2B; F(1,59) = 7.78, p< 0.01).This
processing advantage for word trials is likely due to a working
memory advantage in encoding and maintaining the central letter
string when it is arranged as a word as compared to a nonword.
In marked contrast, dwell duration on individual letters revealed
a processing disadvantage for word trials. Speciﬁcally, dwells on
individual letters were longer for word trials than for nonword
trials [Figure 2C; F(1,59) = 25.31, p < 0.001]. This processing
disadvantage might be due to difﬁculty in integrating the individ-
ual letters into the central letter string when it is in the form of a
unitary gestalt.
In addition, we contrasted viewing times on the distractor and
solution letters during the ﬁrst half and second half of trials as a
function of both the familiarity of the central letter string (word
vs. nonword) and the reported subjective experience (popout vs.
non-popout). Based on the ﬁndings reported by Ellis et al. (2011),
viewing times for the distractor letter and the solution letters were
expected to be the same at the beginning of trials, whereas solu-
tion knowledge towards the end of trials should result in lower
viewing times on the distractor letter as compared to the solution
letters. To examine this prediction, we compared the proportion
Table 1 | Mean problem solving and eye movement measures shown overall for correct trials, and separately for word and nonword trials.
Variable Overall Word Nonword Significance
Accuracy (% correct) 52.7 (2.4) 51.7 (2.4) 53.8 (2.6) t (59) = 1.52, n.s.
Response time (s) 14.3 (0.4) 15.3 (0.6) 13.4 (0.4) t (59) = 3.25, p < 0.01
Number of dwells, central 7.39 (0.37) 8.11 (0.41) 6.76 (0.37) t (59) = 4.69, p < 0.001
Number of dwells, letters 9.40 (0.55) 10.45 (0.63) 8.53 (0.53) t (59) = 4.80, p < 0.001
Percentage of trials classiﬁed as popout 69.0 (3.4) 68.9 (3.5) 69.2 (3.6) t < 1, n.s.
SEs are shown in parentheses.
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FIGURE 2 | Mean eye movement measures for word and nonword
conditions within popout and non-popout trials: initial latency on the
central letter string (A); subsequent dwell duration on the central
letter string (B); and dwell duration on individual letters (C).
of time spent on the distractor letter and the mean of the two
solution letters separately for the ﬁrst and second half of trials.
Accordingly, we conducted 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVAs on the proportion
of viewing time with letter type (distractor vs. solution), sub-
jective report (popout vs. non-popout) and central letter string
type (word vs. nonword) as independent variables. As can be seen
in Figures 3A–D, for all conditions, there was no difference in
the ﬁrst half of trials between viewing times on the distractor
letter and the solution letters (all ts < 1.50, n.s.). Likewise, the
ANOVA revealed no signiﬁcant main effects or interactions (all
Fs < 2.74, n.s.). In contrast, in the second half of trials for all
conditions, a signiﬁcantly greater proportion of viewing time was
spent on the solution letters as compared to the distractor letter
(all ts > 3.83, all ps < 0.001). In this case, the ANOVA revealed a
signiﬁcant main effect of letter type [F(1,59) = 75.65, p < 0.001]
but no other main effects or interactions approached signiﬁcance
(all Fs < 0.23, n.s.). The lack of any main effect or interaction
involving central letter string type suggests that the accumulation
of solution knowledge prior to insight is independent of the effects
of the familiarity manipulation. Finally, we also examined the pat-
tern of looking behavior during the ﬁrst and second half of trials
in which participants failed to provide a solution for the anagram.
As shown in Figures 3E,F, failure to solve anagrams was reﬂected
by a small but signiﬁcant tendency for greater viewing time on
the distractor letter relative to the solution letters [F(1,59) = 5.51,
p < 0.05]. No other main effect or interaction was signiﬁcant
(all Fs< 2.48, n.s.).
DISCUSSION
The main goal of the present study was to explore the negative
inﬂuence of familiarity on performance in a simpliﬁed anagram
problem solving task. We replicated prior ﬁndings from the ana-
gram literature that showed that task performance is poorer
when anagrams are presented in word form than when they
are presented as scrambled letters (e.g., Beilin and Horn, 1962;
Ekstrand and Dominowski, 1965, 1968; Tresselt and Mayzner,
1965; Mayzner and Tresselt, 1966). This effect is thought to
be due to the difﬁculty in breaking the gestalt of the exist-
ing word in order to rearrange the letter order and form a
new word. However, participants’ eye movements in the present
study revealed a more intricate pattern of the effects of stimulus
familiarity on anagram problem solving, including both interfer-
ence and facilitation. Speciﬁcally, the present study documented
shorter viewing times on the central letter string when it was
presented in word form than in nonword form, suggesting that
participants were better able to encode and maintain the cen-
tral letter string in working memory when it was a meaningful
word than when it was a meaningless string of letters. This ﬁnd-
ing is consistent with the well established perceptual encoding
and working memory advantage for familiar stimuli relative to
unfamiliar stimuli (e.g., Chase and Simon, 1973; Reingold et al.,
2001a).
Of more interest is what the eye movement record revealed
about how familiarity interferes with anagram problem solving.
Our paradigm demonstrated that the interference of stimulus
familiarity was due to longer viewing times on the individual let-
ters when the central letter string was presented as a word than
when it was presented as a nonword. As originally proposed by
Gestalt psychologists, these longer viewing times on the individ-
ual letters might suggest that participants ﬁnd it more challenging
to integrate the individual letters into the central letter string
when it is a holistic entity. Supporting evidence for this possibil-
ity comes from simple letter-insertion tasks that were introduced
by Reingold (1995). For example, similar to the present task, in a
letter-insertion task participants were presentedwith a letter string
that was either a word (e.g., CASH) or a nonword (e.g., CRAH)
and were required to insert one of two alternative letters into the
letter string to create a word (e.g., CRASH). Performance was
substantially better for nonword than word letter strings (Rein-
gold, 1995). Thus, consistent with the conceptualization of Gestalt
psychology, it seems intuitive that restructuring and integrating
new elements into a pre-existing holistic representation would be
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FIGURE 3 | Proportion of viewing time on the solution letters and the distractor letter in the first and second half of trials for each combination of
central letter string type (word in A,C,E; nonword in B,D,F) and trial type (popout in A,B; non-popout in C,D; unsolved in E,F).
more difﬁcult than integrating items into an unrelated collection
of problem elements. However, more work is required in order
to specify the mechanisms underlying this theoretical possibil-
ity, and to explain how familiarity interferes with the integration
process.
Finally, a previous eyemovement study of the Einstellung effect
in chess experts suggested that the activation of familiar schemas in
memory creates perceptual biases towards information that con-
ﬁrms these schemas and away from information that is required
to ﬁnd a less familiar but more optimal solution (e.g., Bilalic´
et al., 2008a). Our eye movement analysis did not reveal a per-
ceptual bias towards the central letter string when it was presented
in word form. This was likely due to the encoding and process-
ing advantages that are associated with the familiar central word.
These advantages might have allowed problem solvers to eas-
ily maintain familiar stimulus information in working memory
while directing their visual attention elsewhere in the stimulus
display. However, participants’ processing resources might have
been captured by the familiar central letter string in ways that
our eye movement methodology could not reveal. Speciﬁcally, it
might be that the familiarity of the central letter string causes
an unhelpful bias in the search for solution words based on the
irrelevant orthographic, phonological, lexical, and/or semantic
activation associated with the central word. Unlike previous ﬁnd-
ings which demonstrated that an exhaustive encoding mental set
could be replaced by a selective encoding strategy which ignores
irrelevant aspects of the stimulus regardless of stimulus familiar-
ity (e.g., Gaschler and Frensch, 2007, 2009; see also Dreisbach
and Haider, 2008, 2009), in the present study, participants were
seemingly unable to ignore the irrelevant but familiar central
word. This is likely due to the fact that the irrelevant activation
caused by the central word was involuntary in nature and required
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processing resources in order to oppose it. Taken together, the
present ﬁndings and prior results indicate that while stimulus
familiarity and domain knowledge are clearly fundamental to
establishing expertise, these aspects of skilled performance are not
without their pitfalls when a problem solving scenario requires
ﬂexibility.
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